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Abstract
When the battlefields were within the visual range, the objective of deception
tactics in warfare was to deceive the human senses. In the battlefield of electromagnetic
spectrum, the objective of deception is to deceive the sensors of the enemy weapon
systems.
The survivability of the aircraft operating in hostile environment is of prime
importance to the mission planner. If the aircraft can deny its location information to the
tracking radar of the radar guided threat missile system, this, in return, may increase its
survivability. The deception, a tactic which stems from the wisdom of ancient battles,
incarnated in the form of Electronic Attack (EA) can give this capability to the aircraft
operating in a hostile environment. Self-Protection Jammers (SPJs) mounted on aircraft
that employ deception-repeater jamming techniques and the resulting effect of the
deception jamming on the enemy sensor systems will be examined in this study.
The impact of the specific flight path and formation geometry should be
considered both from the perspective of coherent SPJs effectiveness and the survivability.
The individual effectiveness of the EA by SPJs is usually limited by the available
Effective Radiated Power (ERP). Due to limitations on the size of the aircraft, one can
not afford to build powerful SPJs. The jamming technique and the effect of multiple
jammers with respect to jamming effectiveness need to be examined for mission planning

xii

analysis. The specific jamming technique evaluated is the combined Range Gate Pull-Off
(RGPO) and Velocity Gate Pull-Off (VGPO) against pulse Doppler radar.
The challenge is to decide the least vulnerable flight path and the formation
geometry for a strike formation in an air-to-ground engagement scenario. The degree of
survivability provided by the combination of the formation geometry, flight path and the
EA (multiple spatially dispersed coherent jammers) is the focus of this research. The
modeling and simulation of the interactions between the self-protection jammer and the
pulse Doppler tracking radar with respect to formation geometry and flight path is the
initial objective.
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INCREASING COMBAT AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY THROUGH
COHERENT SELF-PROTECTION JAMMERS

I. Introduction

“All warfare is based on deception. When near, make it appear you are far away,
when far away, that you are near.”
Sun-Tzu

In 2,500 years, nothing has changed with respect to warfare. In the battlefield of
electromagnetic spectrum, the art of deception still holds a significant place. When the
battlefields were within the visual range, the objective of deception tactics in warfare was
to deceive the human senses. In the battlefield of electromagnetic spectrum, the objective
of deception is to deceive the sensors of the enemy weapon systems.
In modern conventional warfare, tracking of targets in Beyond Visual Range
(BVR) engagements is usually accomplished with tracking radars. The specifications of
these tracking radars vary because they are designed to perform the tasks under various
circumstances.
The surface-to-air radar guided missile systems are among the most formidable
threats to the aircraft operating in hostile environment. These weapon systems rely on
the target location information, which is provided by tracking radar, for the guidance of
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its missiles [1]. Therefore, the deception of tracking radar paves the way for the success
of avoiding the threat weapon system.
For range tracking, the time delay between the transmission of a radar pulse and
the returned echo signal from the target is measured continuously. In addition to this
time delay, the returned echo signal needs to be identified as a target as well [2]. The
identification process for the returned echo signal is prone to deception by Electronic
Attack (EA).
The range tracking errors which influence range measurements arise from thermal
noise, range glint, radial acceleration, and calibration. A detailed discussion can be found
in [1].
Self-protection EA systems tend to use deceptive EA techniques to break the lock
of a tracking radar. The preference for deceptive EA technique over noise jamming
technique stems from the fact that there is always a potential of tracking the noise jammer
in angle or computing the range by using triangulation techniques. And this deficiency of
noise jamming increases the vulnerability of the aircraft. The high efficiency of average
transmitted power usage also favors the choice of deceptive EA techniques to be
employed by the self-protection EA systems [3].
“Deception must never seem incongruous or illogical and should, where possible,
accord with a pattern of events that the enemy has reason to expect” [4]. In this sense,
the expectations of the sensor-to-be-deceived depend on its design characteristics. For
instance, if the sensor is a pulse Doppler radar, then the deception attack should be
planned with respect to the specific design parameters of pulse Doppler radars. In this
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study the threat tracking radar is assumed to have typical design characteristics of a pulse
Doppler radar.
Pulse Doppler radars generally utilize coherent transmission and reception. This
means each transmitted pulse and the receiver local oscillator are synchronized to a
highly stable oscillator. They employ coherent processing and this in return helps reject
main-beam clutter [2].
The survivability of an aircraft operating in hostile environment is of prime
importance to the mission planner. Survivability is defined as the “capability of a system,
including its crew, to avoid or withstand a hostile environment without suffering an
abortive impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission” [5]. If the
aircraft can deny its location information to the tracking radar, this, in return, may
increase its survivability. The deception, which stems from the wisdom of ancient
battles, incarnated in the form of EA, can give this capability to the aircraft operating in a
hostile environment. Self-Protection Jammers (SPJs) mounted on aircraft that employ
deception-repeater jamming techniques will be examined in this study.
In the process of mission planning for an air-to-ground strike mission, one should
decide the least vulnerable flight path and formation geometry of the aircraft to help
increase the survivability of aircraft. The impact of the specific flight path and formation
geometry should be considered both from the perspective of SPJ effectiveness and the
survivability.
The effectiveness of the EA by SPJs is usually limited by the available Effective
Radiated Power (ERP). Due to limitations on the size of the aircraft, one can not afford
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to build powerful SPJs. The jamming technique and the effect of multiple jammers with
respect to jamming effectiveness need to be examined for mission planning analysis.
Problem Statement
The challenge is to decide the least vulnerable flight path and the formation
geometry for a strike formation in an air-to-ground engagement scenario. The degree of
survivability provided by the combination of the formation geometry (multiple spatially
dispersed jammers), flight path and the EA is the focus of this thesis. The modeling and
simulation of the interactions between the self-protection jammer and the pulse Doppler
tracking radar with respect to formation geometry and flight path is the initial objective.
Incentive for the Study
The emphasis on the survivability of the tactical aircraft increases for a set of
reasons. These reasons include the fact that the average cost of a tactical aircraft increases
due to the implementation of new and expensive technologies as a result of the
requirements imposed by the advanced air defense threat systems. This need for an
increased survivability for the tactical aircraft constitutes the basis on which this study is
built. Also the fact that “operational requirements and budget constrains should require
more cost-effectiveness out of modern EW suits and systems” [6] can be viewed as a
supplementary incentive for this research since the research offers a solution to increase
the EW effectiveness without increasing the overall cost.
Chapter II presents a literature review based on open literature. Most related and
crucial information with regard to research is provided while a general level knowledge
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of radar is assumed to be possessed by the reader. Chapter III describes the methodology
used for the research. Chapter IV develops detailed mathematical model for the
coherence of jamming signals and also includes an example of a jamming simulation.
Chapter V focuses on the simulation of the tactical formation geometry and its respective
EA effectiveness. Results, applications of the results and the recommendation on follow
on work are discussed in Chapter VI.
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II. Literature Review
Overview
Tactical mission planning for a strike mission is one of the most challenging tasks
to which military pilots are exposed. Any useful guidelines or information related to
mission planning may be vital in decreasing the cost of the strike for the friendly forces.
The purpose of this literature review is to explore the available information that can be
utilized in the process of building a mathematical model which can produce data useful
for tactical strike mission planning.
The main conventional weapon systems that can be encountered as an air defense
threat has a wide spectrum of variety. Although some general descriptions of these
weapon systems can be found in open literature such as [7], [8], [9], and [1], the
operational specifications of these systems and the tactics employed against such threats
are typically classified. Therefore, the scope of the literature review is based on
fundamental research methods without regard to specific radar systems or threats.
The background information provided in this chapter starts with a discussion on
the sensors of weapon systems and gives an overview of pulse Doppler radar. The
jamming technique examined in the tactical engagement modeling and the concept of
combat survivability is also discussed.
Sensors of the Weapon Systems
Early applications of electronic systems in warfare starts from the applications of
radio direction finder to give platform position and the application of radar to detect
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hostile platform to increase the accuracy of artillery. The latest and the most lethal
application is to use tracking radars in missile precision guidance and this application
leaves any undefended platform with a small probability of survival in most cases [1].
The weapon employment process of any modern conflict usually starts with a
detection phase and followed by the response phase. Detection phase for a missile system
is conducted by a medium-range search radar (acquisition radar) and the response phase
is conducted by the tracking radars and missile launchers. Therefore the victim sensors,
the radar systems which are used in these phases, include search radar, tracking radar,
missile seeker (radio-frequency seeker, infrared seeker), and electro-optic search systems
[1]. In this study the victim sensor of interest is the tracking radar.
Tracking Radar
Tracking radars are assumed to be the primary threats, since they are considered
to be associated with the terminal phases of the air defense missile systems. The primary
mission of a tracking radar is to provide accurate information for missile guidance about
the intended target’s range, azimuth and elevation [1]. Tracking of an airborne target is
usually accomplished by angle trackers and range trackers that are incorporated in
tracking radars [3].
After the designation of target, tracking radar attempts to find and pursue the
target in acquisition phase. In this acquisition phase, the range gate implemented by the
radar is wider than the range gate in tracking phase [1].
The classic tracking radar follows the path of a single target and provides the
measurement of its position in spherical coordinates. The position is tracked in angle and
7

range. The range tracking is accomplished by a servo controlled early-gate/late-gate
range tracker in the radar receiver processor [3]. This closed loop automatic tracking is
usually called split-gate tracking. The signal in each gate is integrated, and the difference
between the amplitudes of the signals in each gate determines the way that the pair of the
gates should move. When the difference of the signals is zero, the pair of the gates are
considered to be centered and this position of the pair of the gates gives the range to the
target [10]. The discrimination between targets in the same angle resolution cell can be
accomplished with narrow range gates [3].
The time period for the analysis of the tactical engagement in this study is the
tracking phase after the acquisition phase.
Radar Resolution
Radar observations are typically defined in four coordinates: azimuth angle,
elevation angle, time delay (range), and frequency (Doppler shift, radial velocity). A
target is considered to be resolved by the radar if the target signal can be separated from
other target signals at least one of these coordinates [11]. Therefore if the target signal
can not be separated from the other signals at any of these coordinates then it will be
processed as a single target.
If the radar is employing an unmodulated pulse then the range resolution is
simply limited with the pulse length. While the shorter unmodulated pulse will give better
resolution, it will also decrease the energy conveyed by the pulse. One of the ways to
overcome this limitation is pulse compression which is utilized in many modern radars.
With pulse compression techniques, the required range resolution can be achieved
8

without sacrificing the pulse energy. In this study the assumption is made that the threat
tracking radar is employing an unmodulated pulse and therefore the range resolution is
given by,

ΔR =

cτ
.
2

(1)

Bandwidth of the receiving antenna Doppler filter and the antenna beam widths
(azimuth and elevation) are the remaining factors that bound the radar resolution cell
[11]. Therefore, with typical numbers the threat radar resolution cell boundaries can be
defined for the modeling purposes.
Automatic Gain Control (AGC)

AGC is implemented in linear type receivers of tracking radars. AGC is needed
for keeping the receiver always within its dynamic range and this is accomplished by
compensating for the variations of target skin return power as a function of range,
fluctuations due to target RCS and clutter [1]. Dynamic range is “the ratio, usually
expressed in decibels, of the maximum to the minimum signal power over which a device
can operate within some specified level of performance” [10].
Pulse Doppler (PD) Radar

In PD radar, the target velocity information is utilized in various processes
including clutter rejection and solution of weapon-guidance equations.
In pulsed Doppler radars, velocity discrimination provides a means of selecting
the target while rejecting clutter within an angle-range resolution cell and also
9

aids in the range tracking function by allowing the accurate prediction of future
positions of the range gates. Generally, target velocity information is required in
fire-control systems to solve the weapon-guidance equations. [3]

The design characteristics incorporated into tracking radars may include
Electronic Protection (EP) capabilities. These capabilities may include low antenna
sidelobes to reduce noise jamming power and pulse compression techniques to provide
the corresponding processing gain to the radar signal while denying the processing gain
to any mismatched jamming waveform. Detailed information on the EP capabilities of a
typical tracking radar such as fast time constant, sensitivity time control, random PRF,
frequency agility, moving target indicator, CFAR receiver, back-bias receiver, dicke-fix
receiver, automatic frequency selection, sidelobe blanking, pulse compression and
jammer strobe can be found in [1].
The EP protection capability of interest to this study is the coherent process
employed by PD which makes it matched to the target Doppler and mismatched to the
noncoherent jamming. This EP, which may be viewed as strength, has a disadvantage that
can be exploited by deception jammer. The coherent process requires that the radar
radiates for a relatively long time at a constant Radio Frequency (RF) and Pulse
Repetition Frequency (PRF). This coherent dwell at a fixed RF and PRF can be exploited
by a SPJ that employs deception EA tactics. These deception EA tactics are usually
supported by digital RF memory (DRFM) that is used to emulate the coherent waveform
[12], [1].
On the other hand in pulse Doppler processing, as a protection from deception
jammers, the range data are differentiated (which gives range rate data) and compared
10

with the Doppler generated range rate data. This comparison allows discrimination
against the deception jamming signals. Also, the acceleration data extracted from
differentiation of the Doppler derived velocity data allows the discrimination of
deception jamming signals with unrealistic accelerations [3], and [13].
The DRFM technology, as a replacement to the earlier application of
recalculating memory loop which is not a coherent method of producing memory,
provides the capability to employ EA tactics such as Range Gate Pull-Off against
coherent radars more effectively [12].
Denial of the actual range rate information to the tracking radar of the threat
system may cause an incoming radar guided missile to miss the target with a large miss
distance where the miss distance is defined as the distance the missile detonates away
from the SPJ.
In PD radar, the range gate’s time position is varied by the expected Time of
Arrival (TOA) of the pulse and the gate variation is conducted at a frequency less than
the Doppler filter bandwidth (<1 kHz). Even though tracking of a pulse is not done in the
conventional radar range tracking sense, the RGPO technique is equally applicable to the
PD radar as well as conventional tracking radars [14].
Range-Gate Pull-Off (RGPO) and Velocity-Gate Pull-Off (VGPO)

RGPO is a deception EA technique described as below:
The classic procedure initially employed by a deceptive SPJ against tracking radar
is to transmit back an amplified replica of the radar waveform which captures the
radar tracking loops. The signal then delayed in range at a rate which
continuously increases, thus simulating a high-velocity accelerating target. At an
appropriate time, the deceptive SPJ signal is removed, causing the tracking radar
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to lose range track with the last measured target position and velocity grossly in
error. [15]

RGPO will not be effective in breaking the lock of PD tracking radar by itself
[43], because, as stated earlier, the PD tracking radar will be checking the consistency of
the two target range rate data sets obtained by the application of two different processes.
The Doppler shift should also be incorporated in the repeated target signal to ensure the
consistency between the Doppler derived range rate data and the range rate data derived
from the differentiation of the target range data [3].
Leading edge range tracking combined with PRF jitter can also effectively deny
any jammer attempting to employ RGPO as a deception jamming technique. But for PD
tracking radar, implementation of PRF jitter in a pulse-to-pulse basis is not possible due
to requirements of the Coherent Processing Interval (CPI). It is also possible for a jammer
to implement very short delays (50 ns to 100ns) to minimize the capabilities of leading
edge range trackers in rejecting the deceptive jamming signal pulses [3].
The jamming power requirement for effective RGPO can be expressed with
regard to signal power from the actual target. Even though a Jamming-to-Signal (J/S)
ratio of 40 dB is required for jamming the angle tracker of typical radar, a J/S ratio of 3
dB can be adequate to employ RGPO in many cases [14].
The total time for one pull-off cycle is typically 6 seconds and the pull-off
program is generally parabolic in form. The rate of pull-off should also stay within the
tracking capabilities of the victim radar. “Typical pull-off rates are on the order of three
times the acceleration due to gravity (3 g), which is within the capability of most radar
12

tracking loops designed to operate against military targets” [14]. Therefore with typical
parameters the total deception range can be found by using the formulation r =

1 2
at
2

which gives 529.2 m ( 1.762 μ sec ).
If the effort by the jammer is identified as an attempt at deception by the victim
radar, then the situation for the airborne platform carrying the jammer can be worse than
no jamming [16].
The technique which includes the pseudo-Doppler shift in the repeated target
signal to capture the tracking radar’s velocity loop is called velocity gate pull-off
(VGPO) [1]. Combination of the VGPO and RGPO can be viewed as the half of the total
jamming effort necessary to break lock. This combination should be supported by
another jamming effort aimed at breaking the angular track capability of hostile radar.
The effect of RGPO and VGPO can be analyzed based on the ambiguity function.
For instance, “if the target return wave and RGPO jamming are within the ambiguity
degree plot, then the radar cannot resolve the two signals. At this instant, RGPO is
effective, for the radar range tracking wave gate locks on the jamming instead of the
target” [17].
Combat Survivability

Combat survivability of aircraft has always been of interest to mission planners
throughout the history of air warfare. The earlier belief that high performance military
aircraft with transonic or supersonic speed were invulnerable to enemy air defenses has
changed since the Vietnam War and the 1973 Arab-Israel War. The Egyptian and Syrian
13

air defense systems along with the synergy of missiles and guns (missile evasion
maneuvers put the Israel aircraft in the effective range of MANPADS and light
antiaircraft fire) caused Israel to lose 109 aircraft (%35 of its prewar inventory) in 9 days
of war. In response to this new form of war, technological options adapted for military
need and standoff precision attack, standoff jamming and finally low observables
introduced into the theater. In 1991, during the opening night of Operation Desert Storm,
478 Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD), sweep and escort aircraft used
techniques such as jamming, drones decoys and direct anti-radar missile attack and struck
144 targets at the cost of only one SEAD aircraft [18]. These facts confirm the impact of
EW on the survivability.
One method to conceal the the approach of penetrating aircraft is to fly at very
low altitudes to take advantage of the radar’s inability to detect targets over the horizon.
This method requires sophisticated navigation systems that are designed to enable the
penetrating aircraft to maintain the desired route altitude until it reaches the designated
target [14]. In Desert Storm, coalition forces lost thirty-eight aircraft and most of them
were shot down because they persisted to fly low-level tactics for various reasons [19].
Therefore, it can be inferred that aircraft flying at medium or high altitude had a better
survivability. But depending on the changing air defense environment, it is becoming less
probable to increase the survivability of aircraft by just flying outside or above of the
enemy airspace [20]. Therefore, it can be inferred that the exposure to threat weapon
systems is inevitable and the need for increased survivability should be satisfied with
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alternative approaches. The impact of the flight profile, specifically the altitude, is one of
the considerations examined within the scope of this study.
Another method to conceal the approach of the penetrating aircraft can be
discussed as
Another method pursued that still receives much attention is the reduction of the
echo power reflected from the protected vehicle, using special design techniques
and absorptive coatings on the vehicle’s reflecting surface; this approach is
commonly known as the stealth technique. [14]
While this method is not within the scope of this study further discussions from the
perspective of survivability can be found in [21].
Electronic Attack (EA) is the third method to conceal the penetrating aircraft [14]
and this study is mainly concerned about the execution of this method and its impact on
the survivability.
Survivability is defined as the capability of avoiding or withstanding threats in
the tactical arena [22].
The survival of a military aircraft operating in a hostile environment depends
upon many diverse factors, such as the design of the aircraft, the skill and
experience of the crew, the armament carried, the onboard countermeasures
equipment, the off board supporting systems, and the tactics employed. [22]

The Self Protection Jammer (SPJ) falls in the category of onboard
countermeasures that are designed to increase the survivability of the aircraft in a hostile
environment.
Impact of EW and Flight Path on Survivability

Survivability can be further described by the terms susceptibility and
vulnerability. Susceptibility is defined as “the degree to which a system is open to
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effective attack due to one or more inherent weakness” [22]. It can also simply be defined
as the inability of the aircraft to avoid a hit [23]. Vulnerability is defined as the inability
of an aircraft to perform its assigned mission due to degradation caused by the exposure
of the aircraft to man-made threat environment [3], [22]. In other words, vulnerability is
the inability of the aircraft to withstand a hit [23]. Therefore, in order to increase
survivability one should reduce the susceptibility and vulnerability of the aircraft.
Reducing the ability of the enemy systems to see or hit the aircraft of friendly forces is
the basic procedure for reducing susceptibility [24]. Reducing susceptibility can be
achieved by passive signature reduction and active countermeasures. While signature
reduction delays and degrades the acquisition process of threat system it also enhances
jammer performance by increasing the ratio of jamming to signal (J/S) [25]. Nevertheless
this study attempts to explore the active countermeasure procedures to increase the
survivability by reducing susceptibility. One way to implement this procedure is to use
onboard electronic attack equipment to degrade enemy tracking and missile guidance
systems [22].
Recent studies argue that instead of improving one of the factors that affect
survivability one should attempt to increase survivability through a “layered approach”
[20] or an “onion skin approach” [26] and [6]. These approaches aim at improving a
combination of factors on which the survivability depends as defined previously. A
similar approach is attempted in this study as well.
In modern EW, the priorities of the self-protection systems can be discussed as:
The first priority is to counter the approaching missile by increasing the missile’s
miss distance. The second priority is to deceive or to “break” the lock of threat’s
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target acquisition sensor or fire control radar before launch, or even after launch,
if the missile is semi active homing. The third priority is to counter the acquisition
phase of the threat’s fire-control radar trying to deny successful lock on. [6]

“Modern self protection concepts for mission survivability employ the outer
protection layers of the onion” [6] where the outer layer can be described as flight route
selection, mission planning, intelligence, signature reduction, terrain masking,
countermeasures and Situational Awareness (SA) which is supported by self-protection
systems. The common objective of these techniques is to avoid detection [26].
The second and the first priority concepts utilize SPJs as well as maneuvers and
SA to avoid being hit [26] and [6].
The focus of the study is to explore the interaction between the effectiveness of
electronic attack and various flight paths/geometries which can be visualized as a slice
cut vertically from the “onion” discussed above. The ultimate outcome is expected to be
an increase in survivability with the same equipment but different flight path and/or flight
geometry. The effect of multiple jammers carried by the formation elements (multiple
spatially dispersed jammers) is inspected from the perspective of coherency of the EA
signals. Finally a survivability analysis is conducted.
Self-Protection Jammer (SPJ)

Self-protection jamming is an EA tactic in which the jammer is carried on the
platform that is being tracked by the hostile radar. SPJs are usually the EA systems that
repeat the received threat signal to deceive enemy electronic system. SPJs can also be in
the form of noise jammers [15].
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In modern applications, SPJs are usually integrated with Radar Warning
Receivers (RWR) and provide automatic threat response. The threats identified by the
RWR are also displayed to pilot throughout the process. Power management algorithms
are used so as to match the countermeasures to the constantly changing threat picture. It
is possible to use separate directional jammers on different parts of the aircraft to increase
the spatial coverage of the jamming effort [9].
It is an important aspect of the SPJ that it must respond to the changes in the
threat parameters as quickly as possible. In an optimum case, the SPJ should be able to
reprogram itself during the engagement, even though the threat parameters are changing
quickly. The tactical engagement scenarios examined in this study include aircraft with
SPJ of deception-repeater type only.
In the modeling and simulation of this work, the type of jammer to be examined is
chosen to be deception-repeater for the following reason:
The deception jammer is most effective (as compared to the noise jammers)
against modern radars which employ coherent integration techniques such as the
pulsed Doppler and pulse-compression types. This occurs because radars
employing coherent integration techniques have a large processing gain against
noise (e.g. on the order of 20 to 60 dB), and hence attenuate the noise jammer
signal by that amount, while necessarily accepting any target-like return
unattenuated. [3]
In addition, deception jammers are more conservative in terms of power while
“noise jammers tend to use a brute-blanket effect” [27] which usually require more
power.
Every repeater jammer has an inherent time delay which can be described as the
“time lapse between the reception of the radar signal by the receive antenna and the
18

radiation of transmission of the repeater output signal” [15]. This inherent time delay is
typically 50ns to 100ns for repeater jammers [3]. This inherent delay is exploited by the
radar designers in EP applications such as leading-edge tracking [14].
Tactical Formation

Basic two-ship formation, called an element, can be used as a building block for
various optimization applications of tactics regarding tactical engagements because “most
effective tactics build a division by combining two or more elements of two fighters”
[28]. Building the campaign level engagement is usually achieved by the addition of
formations in a hierarchical fashion based on the basic model of two-ship formation [29],
and [30]. With a similar mindset basic two-ship formation is evaluated in the tactical
scenarios explored in this study.
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III. Methodology
Overview

Asking questions is the scientific way to start a research [31]. It helps define the
research problem [32]. Defining the research problem can also be done by observation
conducted in a questioning attitude [33]. With the utilization of these two approaches the
question of “How can the survivability of a tactical aircraft formation be increased?” is
asked to define the problem of this thesis.
Based on this question, the research hypothesis (“an imaginative preconception of
a factual relationship” [33]) is postulated because without hypotheses, the scientific
research becomes a mere collection of data [33].
Research Hypothesis

Survivability of a tactical aircraft formation can be increased by planning a proper
formation geometry and flight path along with the employment of coherent selfprotection jammers.
Analysis Method

The next scientific step is to test the hypothesis by experiment. In this case the
experiment is the tactical engagement. Obviously setting up the actual tactical
engagement for testing the hypothesis or observing an actual tactical engagement is not
feasible within the scope of this research. Even though test flights can be designed for
similar purposes it was not an option for this study. The available historical observation
data about the actual tactical engagements in open literature are deemed inadequate in
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technical detail. Therefore, the experiment to test the hypothesis is attempted to be
conducted through mathematical modeling and computer simulation in a theoretical
sense. The validation process of the models used in the experiment needs to be done as
the follow on work to verify the results.
Using low cost simulations as an initial examination tool for tactical applications
can be used effectively in many military applications [29], and [30]. This experiment
through modeling and simulation should be viewed as a preliminary experiment which is
designed to conserve resources. The positive results from a preliminary experiment can
be viewed as a motivation to conduct more extensive experimentation [33].
The “method of difference” is utilized for developing the hypothesis. This method
states “if an event is repeated with one factor but not another, the first factor is the
causative agent” [33]. This method is implemented as a comparison and assessment of
the resulting probabilities of survival of the two engagement scenarios. In the first
scenario, SPJs are employed in a non-coherent fashion whereas in the second scenario
they are employed in a coherent fashion. Quantitative models and simulations are used as
part of this highly analytic research effort.
The outcome of the analytic research is expected to be the knowledge which is
then processed by synthesis to generate understanding [26]. Synthesis is implemented as
interpretation of the data arrived at the end of the experiment. The test of hypothesis is
completed based on this understanding.
From the approach in [34] (shown in Fig. 1), the overall methodology of the
analysis may be summarized as a study into the interaction (from the perspective of
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survivability) between the factors of Electronic Warfare (EW) and flight path and
geometry. Using modeling and simulation, two ship formations are studied to determine
when and how self-protection jammers may be used coherently against tracking radar.

EW
(SPJ)

Modeling & Simulation

Flight Path
&
Formation
Geometry

SURVIVABILITY

Figure 1: Overall analysis methodology [2].

Modeling and Simulation

In tactical engagement scenarios, the number of variables changing
simultaneously usually presents a serious challenge for the modeling and simulation
process. The designed model would possibly produce results only over a small part of the
time period of interest [35]. The parameters of interest should therefore be chosen
carefully. The modeling and simulation methodology is utilized from the perspective of
EW. The resolution of the models is arranged with respect to their proposed impact on
the EW concerns.
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IV. Coherence of the Jamming Signals
Overview

Power and energy concepts are widely used as a measure of the signal size, and
these concepts are discussed thoroughly in [36] and [37]. The coherence analysis is built
upon the concepts of power and energy. The mathematical representation of the
instantaneous and average power, and the energy of a signal are defined as [38]

pinst (t ) = s (t )
pav (t ) =

2

( s1 (t ) + s2 (t ) ≠ s12 (t ) + s22 (t ), not additive),
2

1 b
1 b
pinst (t )dt = ∫ s (t ) 2 dt
∫
a
T
T a

T = b − a,

(2)

b

E = ∫ pinst (t )dt.
a

As discussed in [39] and [40] “coherence” is described by how the signals
constructively add in the receiver. When the pulse signal, which is radiated from a single
jammer source, is observed at the output of the matched filter of the threat radar receiver,
it is assumed to be at a constant energy level. When the second jammer signal is
introduced, depending on the degree of constructive or destructive interference between
the received jammer signals at the threat radar receiver, the energy level at the output of
the matched filter may be higher or lower than the single jammer case. If the output
energy level is higher than the single jammer case then the two spatially dispersed
jammers are called “coherent”. If the output energy level is the same as or lower than the
single jammer case, then the two jammers are called “incoherent” [39].
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Further discussions on the characteristics of coherency can be found in [40]. For
this study, the two jammer signals are considered to be of the same frequency, and the
phase difference between the two jammer signals that arrive at the threat radar receiver is
assumed to stem only from the Jamming Path Difference (JPD). JPD is evaluated as the
primary cause for the Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) between the two jamming
pulse signals.
Deception Jamming J/S Equation Derivation

The size of the received jamming signal and the skin return signal can be
represented as energy signals [41]. Time average of the received signal energy is referred
to as the received power [36]. Therefore,
W = Prτ ,

(3)

where τ is the pulse width and Pr is the peak power (watt) and W is energy. Peak power
and the pulse width determine the energy of the pulse transmitted [42]. Setting Br = 1/ τ
[43], Eq. 3 becomes,
W=

Pr
.
Br

(4)

In an analogous manner jamming energy at the victim radar receiver will be given by

Wj =

Pj
Bj

.

The received power at the victim radar is given by [10]
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(5)

Pr =

PG
σ
t t
Ae ,
2
4π R 4π R 2

(6)

where the effective area of the victim radar receiving antenna Ae is defined as
Ae =

Gt λ 2
,
4π

(7)

assuming the radar is using the same antenna for transmit and receive. Then, for two way
propagation Eq. (6) becomes

Pr =

PG
σ
−0.1α L j
−0.1α L j
t t
Ae (Γ 210
)(Γ 210
),
2
2
4π R 4π R

(8)

where propagation loss factors are defined as follows [44]:
Γ : Propagation factor that takes into consideration the influence of the earth
(underlying terrain) in the area between victim radar and the jammer.
(propagation factor that takes into consideration the influence of the earth (sea)
beneath the path between the jammer and the radar.

α : Attenuation constant (dB/km)
L j : attenuating portion of the path (km)

For the self-protection jamming case the jamming power at the victim radar is
Pj =

Pj G j

4π R

2

Ae (Γ 210

−0.1L j

).

(9)

Then, using Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), the J/S ratio ( W j / Wr ) for self protection jammer case is
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Pj G j 4π R 2 1 0.1L j Br
γ.
J /S =
10
σ Γ2
PG
Bj
t t

(10)

A polarization mismatch coefficient, γ , is also introduced to Eq. 10 since the application
of random polarization in victim radars is a common practice [44]. Deception jamming
waveforms mimic the skin return waveform therefore the bandwidth of the jamming
signal is equal to the bandwidth of the skin return signal [43].

B j = Br .
Therefore, the final form of the J/S equation can be written as

Pj G j 4π R 2 1 0.1L j
10 γ .
J /S =
σ Γ2
PG
t t

(11)

(12)

The J/S ratio is usually used for measuring the jammer effectiveness [45]. As the
range, R, decreases the J/S decreases unless the ERP of the jammer is increased to
compensate for the loss due to decreased range. The jamming power at the radar receiver
can be increased by using multiple spatially dispersed coherent jammers. The
mathematical development for jamming signals and the model for coherence are
discussed next.
Pulse Signal Model

The pulse-Doppler (PD) radar is common, and has a simple mathematical model.
Hence, the pulse-to-pulse analysis in this study is based on the PD radar. Various

26

mathematical models for various types of signals are discussed in the open literature [38],
[45], [44], [46], [47], and the time-domain model of a deterministic signal is simply:
s (t ) = a (t ) cos(ωt + θ ) ,

(13)

where a (t ) , ω , θ represent the pulse envelope, angular frequency and initial phase of
the signal. In a simple radar application, the signal represented by Eq. (13) is transmitted
by the radar toward the target aircraft, reflects, and returns back to the radar receiver [45].
Notional transmitted and received pulses are shown in Fig. 2 where the transmitted pulse
has peak amplitude A, initial phase of 0 degrees, and pulse duration, or width of τ seconds. The received pulse is returned at time 2 TR where TR is the one-way travel time
to the target, and the amplitude is scaled according to the target’s radar cross section and
space loss.

θ =0

A

τ
τ

2TR

Figure 2: Simple voltage pulse representation.

Mathematical Models of the Jamming Signals

For detection of a signal whose parameters are known (with the exception of the
delay), and the noise is Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) the optimum detector
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that can be used is a matched filter [48]. A matched filter is used in almost all radar
receivers to maximize the output signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and its derivation and
implementation are discussed in detail in [10], [2], [11], and [48]. In the presence of
white noise, the matched filter in the PD receiver produces maximum SNR, enabling
target detection within each range bin, or cell. While Doppler processing is also used in
the PD receiver, this study emphasizes EA against range tracking circuits. When multiple
radar returns are received in the same range bin, their MF-output will either be enhanced
or degraded. When false target signals appear in the range cell, range tracking is more
complicated, but the effort here is to use multiple self-protection jammers in a quasicoherent fashion to enhance detection of false targets from the jammers.
The matched filter output is the cross-correlation function of the transmitted and
the received signal when no Doppler shift exists. When Doppler shift is present it is better
to model the matched filter using Fourier Transform methods [10], but for convenience,
the zero-Doppler signals are passed through the matched filter implemented as the
correlation filter [10]:
yout (t ) = ∫

+∞

−∞

yin (λ )h(t − λ )d λ ,

(14)

where the matched filter input signal yin (t ) = s (t ) + n(t ) , s (t ) is the received signal,
n(t ) is the receiver input noise, and assuming input SNR is large, yin (t ) ≈ s (t ) [10].

Additionally, h(t ) is the matched filter’s impulse response function and is designed such
that h(t ) = stx (−tk − t ) , where tk corresponds to the kth range bin. Therefore, the matched
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filter impulse response function of the radar receiver can be modeled with respect to Eq.
(13) as
h(t ) = A0 cos[ω (−tk − t ) + θ 0 ] = stx (−tk − t ) .

(15)

In modern PD radar receivers, range tracking operates across all range bins
making it convenient to define the phase term in Eq. (15) as

θ 0 = ψ 0 − ωt k ,

k = 1, 2,...K ,

(16)

where tk = 2τ k representing the starting time of the kth range bin, and ψ 0 is the initial
phase.

The received skin-return and the false target signals from the target platforms are
expressed similarly to Eqs. (13) and (16) as
ss (t ) = As cos(ωt + θ s ),
s1 (t ) = A1 cos(ωt + θ1 ),
s2 (t ) = A2 cos(ωt + θ 2 ),

(17)
(18)
(19)

θ s = θ0 + δ s ,
θ1 = θ 0 + δ1 ,
θ2 = θ0 + δ 2 ,

(20)
(21)
(22)

where θ s , θ1 and θ 2 and are
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and δ1 = ω (t1 − tk ) , δ 2 = ω (t2 − tk ) and δ s = ω (ts − tk ) . Time of Arrival (TOA) of the signal
from the first jammer is t1 and the TOA of the second jammer signal is t2 . A summary of
the mathematical models for the signals defined so far is given in Table 1.

Table 1: Summary of the mathematical models of the signals.
SIGNAL

MODEL

stx (t ) = A0 cos(ωt +ψ 0 )

Transmitted Signal

h(t ) = A0 cos(−ωt + ψ 0 − ωtk )

Matched Filter
Impulse Response Function
Skin Return Signal
(Unresolved Echo for kth range bin)
Jamming Signal
From Jammer #1
Jamming Signal
From Jammer #2

ss (t ) = As cos[ωt + ψ 0 − ωtk + ω (ts − tk )]
s1 (t ) = A1 cos[ωt + ψ 0 − ωtk + ω (t1 − tk )]
s2 (t ) = A2 cos[ωt +ψ 0 − ωtk + ω (t2 − tk )]

Model for Coherence

The power of the matched filter output can be compared to a threshold to
determine when the two jamming signals achieve success. It should be noted that this
approach is also valid for velocity-gate jamming.
The graphical illustration of the radar range bin and the ideal received signal
pulses are shown in Fig. 3. The convolution process is indicated by the sliding reference
pulse. The TOAs for the skin return signal, signal from Jammer #1 and the signal from
Jammer #2 are marked as ts , t1 and t2 respectively. The kth range bin starting time is
marked tk . The range bin length equals pulse width τ and bandwidth β is
1

β= .
τ
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(23)

In the tactical flight formation, the term “Jammer #1” refers to the self-protection
jammer mounted on the leader aircraft and “Jammer #2” refers to the self-protection
jammer mounted on the wingman. Each self-protection jammer emits the same waveform
with the same initial phase. This may be accomplished by using a common reference
clock. In addition, the jamming antennas are modeled as isotropic sources, so that only
TDOA affects the signals upon arrival at the receiver. Finally, it is assumed that the lead
aircraft is closest in range to the tracking radar in the engagement scenarios making the
specific order of the arrival times of the three pulse signals:

τ < (tk = ts ) ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ PRI .

(24)

Amplitude

t −τ

t

tk = t s

t1

t2

τ

Figure 3: Analytic representation of the input pulses, the convolution process and the range bin representation.

Simulation of Coherence

Based on the mathematical derivation outlined previously, the matched filter
output for the specific range bin is simulated. Pulse width τ is set to 1 μ sec .

31

t

In Figure 4a, TDOA= τ so the jamming pulse signals from two jammers appear in
separate, but adjacent range bins. The normalized instantaneous power and the energy
levels [36] in each range bin are equal (ignoring a slight difference due to sampling)
because the two jamming pulse signals are modeled as identical signals.
In Figure 4b, the two signals overlap in range bin #1 by 53% causing the
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increased MF-output in range bin #1 while the MF-output of range bin #2 decreases.
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Figure 4: Power and the energy analysis of the matched filter output for the specific range bin.

As seen in Fig. 4, the MF-output oscillates, making the coherency oscillatory at
best. In the general case, noise and aircraft flight dynamics make TDOA and coherency
statistical in nature.
Figure 5 illustrates how the energy level in the first range bin (power integrated
over τ ) varies with respect to different TDOA values when the intermediate frequency is
set to 10 MHz. For other frequencies, the energy level will still be bounded by the ideal
matched filter envelope [10] making coherence probabilistic. When the two jamming
pulse signals arrive at the exact same time, TDOA=0 and the maximum energy level is
achieved in the range bin. Yet, as TDOA increases until TDOA ≥ τ , the MF-output is
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equivalent to a single pulse return. In other words, the desired single false target appears
as two distinct false targets depicted in Fig. 4a. While multiple false targets may be
tactically useful, the EA goal is to induce a strong false target in a single range bin.
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Figure 5: Total energy levels in the kth range bin with respect to different TDOAs.

RGPO Simulation

An analytical simulation is given below with the typical jamming parameters
given in [15]. In Figure 6, an A-Scope representation of PD tracking radar is simulated.
The echo (skin return) of the aircraft formation of two ships is shown in Fig. 6a. The
formation aircraft are separated by 110 m, and a constant radial airspeed of 300 m/s is
chosen for both aircraft throughout the simulation. Flight path starts 80 km away from the
tracking radar site. The pulse width ( τ ) for the radar is, τ = 1μ s (radar range resolution is
150 m). So the tracking radar is unable to resolve the two ship formation as seen in Fig.
6a.
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With the onset of the coherent jamming signals from SPJs, the AGC circuitry of
the tracking radar is captured and the AGC level is raised during the dwell time. This is
shown in Fig. 6b.
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Figure 6: RGPO dwell time.

After the dwell time, the deception jamming signal is delayed gradually with a
modified exponential walk function during the total walk time.
In Fig. 7b, the range gates are observed at the simulation time of t = 0.8 sec and
they are tracking the deception signal instead of the target formation. AGC level is also
observed as slightly higher than the skin return of the target formation. This is the desired
result out of the total coherent EA signal power at the victim radar receiver. At this
simulation the total coherent EA signal power is 1.7 times higher than the skin return
signal power of the formation. The coherency of the jamming signals is assumed to be
100% so they perfectly add together.
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The inevitable initial delay of the repeater delay is used as 150 nsec and total walk
off time is 10 μ sec with a total walk time of 5 sec [15]. Both targets assumed to have
identical nonfluctuating RCS values of 2 m 2 .
In Fig. 7a, the target formation echo is shown as it is being tracked by the range
gates. The initial RGPO walk is also depicted in Fig. 7b where the range gates are
observed as tracking the jamming signal.
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Figure 7: Initial RGPO walk.

In Fig. 8, the successful RGPO is observed with snapshots from the total walk
time. At the end of the total walk time the EA signal is turned off and a new RGPO cycle
is initiated after a short time interval.
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Figure 8: Snapshots from RGPO walk time.

If the effort by the SPJ is identified as an attempt to deceive by the victim radar,
then the situation for the airborne platform carrying the SPJ can be worse than if it had
used no jamming [12]. Therefore, the parameters of jamming such as the total walk time,
walk rate and dwell time should be planned for each threat individually. The deception
waveform parameters should also match the reflected waveform parameters in an
optimum fashion.
Summary

The derivation of J/S equation for deception SPJ is given in the beginning of the
chapter. Based on this equation, it is seen that the J/S ratio can be increased by increasing
the jamming power at the victim radar. The analysis for coherence of jamming signals
revealed that for certain intervals of TDOA, the resulting jamming power at the victim
radar is higher than the single jammer case due to coherence. Therefore, the TDOA of the
jamming signals need to be evaluated for different tactical formations and flight paths.
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RGPO simulation is also illustrated as an example for the application of a typical
jamming technique and the importance of the jamming signal power analysis. Evaluation
of the TDOA for different tactical formations and flight profiles are discussed in the next
chapter.
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V. Tactical Scenario
Overview

Because every tactical engagement has its own characteristics, it is highly
unlikely to find a general survivability solution that can be considered valid for every
engagement scenario [27]. For example, single stand-off jamming intentionally removes
the jamming platform from the threat engagement zone, whereas self-protection jamming
is based on an immediate threat to survivability [22]. Therefore the mutual aspects of the
factors affecting survivability, which are discussed in Chapter II, should be evaluated for
the very specific engagement of interest. For the tactical scenario where two or more
aircraft execute the strike mission, these factors should also be evaluated with respect to
mutual support within aircraft formation.
The intention of this study is to explore the interactions between the tactical
formation flight geometry and the theoretical effectiveness of coordinated on-board
countermeasures. Subsequently this data may be useful for mission planning with the
expectation of increased survivability of the tactical formation.
An overall discussion about the general tactical engagement scenario from a
single aircraft point of view and the threat avoidance tactics such as flying low and fast
can be found in [7] while a detailed discussion especially about an engagement in target
area is provided in [8]. However, the tactical scenario chosen for this study is of a
specific and decisive time period to investigate survivability. Tactical consideration is
placed on the survivability of the formation instead of a single aircraft.
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Tactical Scenario Considerations and Assumptions

A threat analysis process may be considered as an appropriate starting point for
the description of a realistic tactical mission scenario. This analysis generally depends on
intelligence data gathered by appropriate means. Open sources may also provide
intelligence for theoretical analysis. For instance, an air defense threat capability map
from a global perspective can be found in [20] where the different levels of expected air
defense threat are marked with regard to different countries.
Even though the threat weapon system in the scenario is assumed to be a fixed
Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) system the overall model is designed so that it can also be
converted to an air-to-air tactical engagement scenario. The missile guidance is assumed
to be accomplished only by tracking radar of coherent pulsed Doppler type and the terrain
of the engagement is considered to be plain and having no significant effect or limitation
on the overall evaluation.
The deception tactic can be used to degrade the state of readiness of the enemy
weapon system [20] which then may allow to apply the so-called principle of “the best
defense is to avoid detection” [1]. But this perspective of deception is not evaluated and
the weapon systems are considered to be alert and ready to fire.
Despite the fact that “intimate intelligence database for each threat and for each
threat-mode is required in order to generate effective techniques” [6], the threat missile
specifications and the missile performance are not modeled but the missile is assumed to
be using command guidance. The distinction between the different guidance systems of
missiles is usually related to their designed missions. Medium-to-long range missiles (5039

150 km) are designed for local area defense and tend to utilize semiactive homing or
active homing guidance. On the other hand medium-to-long range missiles are designed
for defending a target of great value and tend to utilize beam-riding or command
guidance [1]. Further classifications of the missile guidance systems are discussed in [49]
and [50] such as preset guidance and terrestrial guidance including beam rider, command
guidance and seeker or homing guidance.
In command guidance, two separate tracking radars track the missile and the
target simultaneously. The target and missile states are fed to a central computer for the
calculation of the missile trajectory for successful interception. The calculated missile
trajectory commands are then transmitted to the missile [2]. The victim radar for the EA
in the engagement scenario is the coherent pulsed Doppler tracking radar that is assumed
to be tracking the target for the missile guidance.
When no EA is present, the rms target-to-missile miss distance of a command
guidance missile at range R is given by [1]

2
md = ε tgt
+ ε m2 sl ,

where ε tgt is the precision of the radar that is tracking the target while ε msl is the
precision of the radar tracking the missile. The objective of range deception jamming
may be viewed as an attempt to increase the ε tgt value described above. Further
discussion on the precision of target tracking can be found in [1].
Alternatively, it is also possible to use a single radar in command guidance
systems. This type of guidance is called “command-to-line-of-sight” missile guidance
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(25)

and the missile is commanded to stay within the radar beam throughout the engagement.
More detailed information on command guidance and the calculation of miss distance in
this type of guidance can be found in [1], [49], and [50].
Typical airborne active and passive countermeasure systems include
chaff/flare/decoy dispenser systems, self-protection or escort radar jammers, Directional
Infra-Red Counter Measures and stealth, and may be integrated with a RWR or similar
equipment for the automatic response to a threat in tactical arena [9]. The specific
employment procedures are not the focus of this research. Hence, this study focuses on
SPJ systems that employ deception jamming techniques, the impact of the flight
geometry on the mutual jamming effort of the tactical strike formation and the resulting
degree of survivability.
While “it is not uncommon to find chaff and active EA used simultaneously in
certain cases” [27], the study focuses on only active EA in this regard within the scope of
the scenario described above. One disadvantage with the chaff employment is the fact
that it may be impossible for the tactical aircraft to carry enough chaff for the complete
duration of the mission. Therefore, if the operational information about the correct time
to dispense chaff is not available, then the reliance on chaff may present a deficiency
[27].
Aircraft Position Error

The deterministic positions of the aircraft for any time during the flight profile are
represented as

41

JG
 (t ) + yy (t ) + zz
 (t ),
r1 = xx
1
1
1
JG



r2 = xx2 (t ) + yy2 (t ) + zz2 (t ),

(26)

where the origin of the coordinate system is at the victim radar site, making
JG JG
JPDdet = r2 − r1 deterministic. However, the actual position of the aircraft may be

slightly different than the desired position because of calibration error of the navigation
instruments, inaccuracy in available navigation data, pilot error, instabilities in the
atmosphere and so on. Therefore, in a rigorous way, if we assume that the maximum
probable position error is equal for all three axes and has a Gaussian distribution with
zero mean and variance σ p2 , then the actual position of the aircraft can be anywhere, but
the highest probability is for position near the desired flight path. It is also reasonable to
approximate the distribution as uniform making the position vary within a sphere and
with equal probability. The sphere’s center is the intended position of the aircraft and the
radius of the sphere is the maximum probable position error. This position error should
be accounted for all the aircraft in the formation.

This random position error is simulated as Δ JPD and the actual jamming path
difference is
JPDactual = JPDdet + Δ JPD

(27)

Note that this random position error Δ JPD can be included in Eq. (26) for each
JG
JG
axis, but is easily included as a one-dimensional variable because r1 and r2 will change
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with the same distribution. This approach is also easily verifiable with telemetry or
measured position data.
The sample space for Δ JPD is limited to the interval [a, b] with zero mean and
a = −b = maximum position error (as a vector magnitude). Therefore, the sample space

for JPDactual is simply shifted as Ω JPD = [ JPDdet + a, JPDdet + b] . As stated previously,
TDOA is assumed to result from JPD only. Therefore, it is possible to map from JPDactual
to TDOAactual by scaling Eq. (27) by the speed of light, c, as
1
TDOArand = ( JPDdet + Δ JPD ),
c
= TDOAdet + ΔTDOA ,

(28)

Figure 9 illustrates the sample space for ΩTDOA when uniformly distributed, but
this approach is suitable for Gaussian or other distributions. This sample space is used in
the following section to compute the probability of coherence.

TDOAactual
TDOAdet −

a
c

TDOAdet

TDOAdet +

Figure 9: Sample space (continuous) for random variable

b
c

TDOAactual .

Probability of Coherence

Due to the assumption that aircraft position error has a uniform distribution, and
receiver noise is a Gaussian random process [10], the resulting coherence of the jamming
signals need to be defined as a random process. Keeping in mind the assumption that the
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jamming signal from Jammer #1 arrives at the beginning of the range bin, we define the
event ^ as
^ : Both jamming signals arrive in the same range bin of interest, i.e.
0 ≤ TDOAactual ≤ τ , and they are coherent according to the definition in Section 2.0. In

other words, the resulting range bin energy exceeds the threshold set for coherency.
From the previous discussion, TDOA is a random process that can be defined by a
probability density function, and Fig. 5 displays the conditional probability density
function for coherency given TDOA. Therefore, the probability of coherence is [51]
P[^] =

∫

[^ | λ ][λ ]d λ ,

(29)

Ω actual

where [^ | λ ] and [λ ] are the probability density functions and the integration interval is
shown in Fig. 9.
Two-Ship Formations

Two-ship formation can be described as “a team of two fighters acting in concert
against the adversary” [52]. In this formation, one of the aircraft is designated as leader
and the second aircraft is designated as wingman. Depending on the tactics to be
employed for the specific mission, geometry of the formation varies. In line abreast
formation wingman flies directly abeam the leader while in trail formation wingman flies
directly behind the leader. The basic principle of the formation is the mutual support of
the aircraft within the formation. Further information on the formation types such as
fighting wing, echelon, and fluid formation can be found in [52].
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Trail Formation

The two-ship formation flying in trail and the jamming paths of the individual
aircraft are depicted in Fig. 10. The formation is assumed to be perfectly aligned with the
threat radar x-axis. The altitudes and radial velocities of the two aircraft are exactly the
same. The distance marked as dx in Fig. 10 is the trail distance between the elements of
the formation that is of importance for the mission planning process.
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Figure 10: Tactical Scenario Case #1.
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Finding the Probability of Coherence

The two-ship formation flying in trail and the jamming paths of the individual
aircraft are depicted in Fig. 10. The TDOAdet is given by the chart in Fig. 11 for various
altitudes and trail distances, dx .
The chart shows results for the scenario where the lead aircraft is at 15 NM lateral
distance from the threat radar. If the formation is flying at 10 000 feet with a trail distance
of 300 feet then from Fig. 11, TDOAdet equals 0.606 μ sec . When the maximum probable
position error is 100 feet then the sample space for TDOAactual is ΩTDOA = [0.5044, 0.7076] .
With this flight path and formation geometry P[^] = 0.595.
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Figure 11: Charts for

200
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interval analysis for case #1.

Line abreast Formation

In this case, lead aircraft is perfectly aligned with the threat radar x-axis while the
wingman is flying at the parallel flight path at the same altitude with same radial velocity.
This scenario is depicted in Fig. 13 where the individual jamming paths are also shown.
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The distance marked as dy in Fig. 13 is the line abreast distance that is of
importance for mission planning.
Finding the Probability of Coherence

The TDOAdet for various altitudes and various dy values are given in Fig. 12. The
chart is drawn for the scenario where the lead aircraft is at 15 NM lateral distance from
the threat radar. If the formation is flying at 10 000 feet with a line abreast distance of
5000 feet, then from Fig. 12 TDOAdet equals 0.2768 μ sec . When the maximum probable
position error is 100 feet, ΩTDOA = [0.1752, 0.3784] .
Similarly, this flight path and formation geometry results in P[^] = 0.635 .
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Figure 12: TDOA with respect to different line abreast distances.
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Figure 13: Tactical scenario case #2.
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Flight Profile Simulation and Coherence

Based on the examples explained in previous sections, six flight profiles with
different parameters are evaluated. The primary design objective of the flight profile
simulations is to evaluate the impact of the trail and line-abreast distance on the
probability of coherence of the jamming signals. Based on the analysis of coherence,
results are evaluated from the perspective of survivability.
Flight Simulation

The flight simulation model, a six-degrees-of-freedom nonlinear aircraft model
which is used for flight profile trials in this study, was developed by Maj. Paul A. Blue
and Maj. Mathew W. Coldsnow at Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) [53]. The F16 simulation model is based on the book “Aircraft Control and Simulation”, 2nd Edition,
by B. Stevens and F. Lewis. As mentioned in reference above, the F-16 model uses the
data from NASA-Langley wind tunnel tests [54] on a subscale model of an F-16 airplane.
Flight simulation is primarily designed for preliminary evaluation of flight tests.
In the first of three profiles, the initial formation type is set as trail formation
while line-abreast formation is used for the remaining three flight profiles. A 20-degree
check turn is initiated by the formation during the simulation and this turn is designed to
allow the evaluation of a third formation geometry called fighting wing formation. This
type of formation geometry is discussed in [52].
Aircraft position error is simulated in three axes by the addition of Gaussian
position error with zero mean. Maximum position error (variation) is assumed to be 25
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feet. Fluctuations in the flight paths of individual aircraft due to position error can be seen
in Fig. 14.
For all six profiles evaluated below, victim radar is assumed to be operating at a
PRF of 1000 Hz and the total simulation time is fixed at 154 seconds. These parameters
yielded a total of 154 000 pair of pulses for the entire profile.
Profile #1

In this profile, two-ship trail flight formation is used. The trail distance, dx, is set
as 250 feet. Flight parameters for Profile #1 are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Parameters for profile #1.
PROFILE #1
TRAIL

Airspeed
First Leg
(1.5 min)

Airspeed
Second Leg
(1 min)

Altitude
(feet)

Turn Rate
(for 20°
check turn)

Leader

450 K

450 K

20 000

5 deg/min

Wingman

450 K

450K

20 000

5 deg/min

Trail
Distance
‘dx’
(feet)

250

Trail formation geometry used for the simulation is shown in Fig. 14 as a
snapshot from the actual simulation. This visualization is taken from the beginning of the
first leg.
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Figure 14: A snapshot from the beginning of the actual flight profile simulation for visualization of the trail formation geometry
[53].

The top view of the flight profile flown is given in Fig. 15. Starting position is
chosen 25 NM away from the victim radar. Victim radar location is defined as the origin
for the simulation. Total flight profile lasted 154 seconds. The first leg is flown for 90
seconds followed by a 20-degree check turn which is completed in 4 seconds. The second
leg is flown for 60 seconds.
Both aircraft initiated the check turn at time t = 90 s and the top view of the flight
profile containing the turn is enlarged in Fig. 16 for clarification of the fighting wing
formation in the second leg.
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Figure 15: Top view for the complete profile #1.
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Figure 16: Check turn flight profile top view zoomed.
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0.3

0.4

A simulation snapshot during the turn is given in Fig. 17a and the observation
point for this snapshot is shown in Fig. 16. Note that both aircraft initiate the turn at the
same time which results in the fighting wing formation as shown in Fig. 17b.

(a)

(b)

Figure 17: Check turn and the trail formation changes to fighting wing formation [53].

The coherence of jamming signals for the complete profile is evaluated. Using the
coherence model that is developed in Chapter IV, the total energy levels for the 154 000
pair of pulses are found and shown in Fig. 18. A summary of the resulting coherence is
given below Fig. 18. When the TDOA is greater than the range bin width, pulses arrive in
different range bins. These pulses are referred to as “separate pulses”. In this flight
geometry, all pair of pulses stayed within the range bin of interest; thus, the value for the
number of separate pair of pulses is zero. Note that the total energy after the turn
increased when the formation geometry is fighting wing. The probability of coherence is
given by the ratio of the number of pulse pairs to the total number of pulse pairs.
Therefore, P[C ] = 0.78 is found with the results given below Fig. 18. A Probability
Density Function (PDF) is also given in
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Figure 18-Energy levels in the range bin of interest for each pair of pulses during profile#1

(Number of coherent pair of pulses= 120091, Number of noncoherent pair of pulses= 33909,
Number of separate pair of pulses= 0, Number of total pair of pulses=154000).

For the observation of the distribution of the total energy levels in the range bin of
interest, probability density function for the 250 feet trail formation is given in Fig. 19.
Note that P[C ] can be calculated for different threshold values. Energy levels in the xaxis are normalized by the single pulse energy level of the matched filter output.
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Figure 19-Probability density function for 250 feet trail formation.

Profile #2

In this profile, two-ship trail flight formation is used. The trail distance, dx, is set
as 500 feet. Flight parameters for Profile #2 are given in Table 3.
Table 3: Parameters for profile #2.
PROFILE #2
TRAIL

Airspeed
First Leg
(1.5 min)

Airspeed
Second Leg
(1 min)

Altitude
(feet)

Turn Rate
(for 20°
check turn)

Leader

600 K

600 K

10 000

5 deg/min

Wingman

600 K

600K

10 000

5 deg/min
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Trail
Distance
‘dx’
(feet)

500

The altitude, trail distance and the airspeed of the flight profile is changed with
the values given in Table 3. The total time of the simulation is fixed and 154 seconds.
The total energy levels in the range bin of interest for the complete profile #2 is given in
Fig. 20. The probability of coherence is given by the ratio of the coherent pair of pulses
to total pair of pulses. Therefore, P[C ] = 0.32 is found with the results given below Fig.
20. Note that the total energy levels after the turn increase drastically while the
probability of coherence is low compared to the results from profile #1. It is observed that
an initial trail distance of 500 feet yields a higher probability of coherence than the initial
trail distance of 250 feet after the turn. On the other hand during the first leg of the profile
probability of coherence is significantly higher with a trail distance of 250 feet.
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Figure 20: Energy levels in the range bin of interest for each pair of pulses during profile#2

(Number of coherent pair of pulses= 41866, Number of noncoherent pair of pulses= 41495,
Number of separate pair of pulses=70639, Number of total pair pulses=154000).
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The number of separate pair of pulses is not zero for profile #2. This situation can be
observed with the evaluation of the distribution of the first 1540 pair of pulses. Fig. 21
depicts the distribution of the energy levels for the first 1540 pair of pulses for profile #2.
Note that this trail distance of 500 feet results 1136 separate pair of pulses out of 1540
pair of pulses during the first leg. When the pulses arrive with a TDOA greater than range
bin width, energy level in the range bin of interest reflect the normalized energy level of
1 because only one jamming signal results in the range bin of interest. The second pulse
arrives in adjacent range bins depending on the value of TDOA. This situation is also
depicted in Fig. 4a where two separate pulses are observed in two different range bins
due to the value of TDOA.
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Figure 21: Distribution of the total energy levels in the range bin of interest for profile #2.

(Number of coherent Pulses= 307, Number of Non coherent Pulses= 97, Number of Total
Pulses=1540, Number of Separate Pulses=1136).
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PDF for the profile #2 is given in Fig. 22 for the observation of the overall
distribution of the pulses and the respective probability. Similarly it is possible to
evaluate different threshold values for coherence based on the respective probabilities
given in Fig. 22. Energy levels in the x-axis are normalized by the single pulse energy
level of the matched filter output.
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Figure 22- Probability density function for 500 feet trail formation.

Profile #3

This profile is also flown by a two-ship trail flight formation. The trail distance,
dx, is set as 750 feet. Flight parameters for profile #3 are given in Table 4.
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Table 4: Parameters for profile #3.
PROFILE #3
TRAIL

Airspeed
First Leg
(1.5 min)

Airspeed
Second Leg
(1 min)

Altitude
(feet)

Turn Rate
(for 20°
check turn)

Leader

450 K

450 K

20 000

5 deg/min

Wingman

450 K

450K

20 000

5 deg/min

Trail
Distance
‘dx’
(feet)

750

The altitude, trail distance and the airspeed of the flight profile is changed with
the values given in Table 4. The total time of the simulation is fixed and 154 seconds.
The total energy levels in the range bin of interest for the complete profile #3 is given in
Fig. 23. As seen in the Fig. 23, total energy level in the range bin of interest is reflecting
only single jamming pulse because of the trail distance jamming pulses arrive in different
range bins. Therefore P[C ] = 0 is found.
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Figure 23: Energy levels in the range bin of interest for each pair of pulses during profile#3

(Number of coherent pair of pulses= 0, Number of noncoherent pair of pulses= 0, Number of
seperate pair of pulses=154000, Number of total pair of pulses=154000).
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Profile #4

In this profile, two-ship line-abreast flight formation is used. The line-abreast
distance, dy, is set as 4000 feet. Flight parameters for profile #4 are given in Table 5.
Table 5: Parameters for profile #4.
PROFILE #4

Airspeed
First Leg
(1.5 min)

Airspeed
Second Leg
(1 min)

Altitude
(feet)

Turn Rate
(for 20°
check turn)

Leader

600 K

600 K

10 000

5 deg/min

Wingman

600K

600K

10 000

5 deg/min

LINEABREAST

Line abreast
Distance
‘dy’
(feet)

4000

Line-abreast formation geometry used for the simulation is shown in Fig. 24 as a
snapshot from the actual simulation. This visualization is from the beginning of the first
leg.

Figure 24: A snapshot from the beginning of the actual flight profile simulation for visualization of the line abreast formation
geometry [53].
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The top view of the flight profile flown is given in Fig. 25. Similar to trail
formation profiles, starting position for the leader aircraft is chosen 25 NM away from
the victim radar. Victim radar location is defined as the origin for the simulation. Total
flight profile is lasted for 154 seconds. First leg is flown for 90 seconds followed by a
20° check turn which is completed in 4 seconds. Second leg is flown for 60 seconds.
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Figure 25: Top view for the complete profile #4.

Both aircraft initiated the check turn at time t = 90 s and this resulted in a lineabreast formation geometry where the wingman is in a relatively forward position
compared to initial line-abreast position in the first leg. Fig. 26a is snapshot visualization
from the actual simulation showing the simultaneous initiation of the check turn by both
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aircraft. The resulting formation geometry described above can be observed in Fig. 26b.
The airspeed of the wingman and the leader kept equal and constant as given in Table 5.

(a)

(b)

Figure 26: Check turn and the line-abreast formation is distorted from the initial setup parameters [53].

Similarly, the coherence of jamming signals for the complete profile is evaluated.
Using the coherence model that is developed in Chapter IV, the total energy levels for the
154 000 pair of pulses are found and shown in Fig. 27. A summary of the resulting
coherence is given below Fig. 27. The probability of coherence is given by the ratio of
the coherent pair of pulses to total pair of pulses. Therefore P[C ] = 0.40 is found with the
results given below Fig. 27. This probability of coherence is calculated for the entire
profile.
However it must be noted from Fig. 27 that the pair of pulses arrive in separate
range bins mostly after the turn. For the specific time interval the probability of
coherence is given by the ratio of the coherent pair of pulses to total pair of pulses. This
implies that the overall probability of coherence for the entire flight path can be
misleading in many cases.
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Figure 27: Energy levels in the range bin of interest for each pair of pulses during profile#4

(Number of coherent pair pulses= 61214, Number of noncoherent pair of pulses= 36944, Number of
separate pair of pulses=55842, Number of total pair of pulses=154000).

Probability density function for profile #4 is given in Fig. 28. Note that P[C ] can
be calculated for different threshold values because any energy level can be set as a
threshold for coherence and the respective probability for coherence can be evaluated
from Fig. 28. Energy levels in the x-axis are normalized by the single pulse energy level
of the matched filter output.
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Figure 28: Probability density function for 4000 feet line abreast formation.

Profile #5

In this profile is also flown as a two-ship line-abreast flight formation. The lineabreast distance, dy, is set as 5000 feet. Flight parameters for Profile #5 are given in
Table 6. Note that in this profile, the airspeed for the wingman is decreased by 30 K in
the second leg with an attempt to preserve initial formation geometry after the turn.
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Table 6: Parameters for Profile #5.
PROFILE #5

Airspeed
First Leg
(1.5 min)

Airspeed
Second Leg
(1 min)

Altitude
(feet)

Turn Rate
(for 20°
check turn)

Leader

500 K

500K

15 000

5 deg/min

Wingman

500K

470K

15 000

5 deg/min

LINEABREAST

Line abreast
Distance
‘dy’
(feet)

5000

The altitude, line-abreast distance and the airspeed of the flight profile is changed
with the values given in Table 6. The total time of the simulation is fixed and 154
seconds. The total energy levels in the range bin of interest for the complete profile #5
are given in Fig. 29. The probability of coherence is given by the ratio of the coherent
pair of pulses to total pair of pulses. Therefore, for the duration of the entire profile,

P[C ] = 0.43 is found with the results given below Fig. 29.
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Figure 29: Energy levels in the range bin of interest for each pair of pulses during profile#4

(Number of coherent pair pulses= 66188, Number of noncoherent pair of pulses= 32053, Number of
separate pair of pulses=55759, Number of total pair of pulses=154000).
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Probability density function for profile #5 is given in Fig. 30. Similarly different
energy levels can be set as a threshold for coherence and the respective probability for
coherence can be evaluated for this profile as well.
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Figure 30: Probability density function for 5000 feet line abreast formation.

Profile #6

This profile is also flown as a two-ship line abreast flight formation. The line
abreast distance, dy, is set as 6000 feet. Flight parameters for profile #6 are given in
Table 7. Note that in this profile, similar to the profile #5, the airspeed for the wingman is
decreased by 30 K in the second leg with an attempt to preserve initial formation
geometry after the turn.
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Table 7: Parameters for profile #6.
PROFILE #6

Airspeed
First Leg
(1.5 min)

Airspeed
Second Leg
(1 min)

Altitude
(feet)

Turn Rate
(for 20°
check turn)

Leader

450 K

450K

10 000

5 deg/min

Wingman

450K

420K

10 000

5 deg/min

LINEABREAST

Line abreast
Distance
‘dy’
(feet)

6000

The total energy levels in the range bin of interest for the complete profile #6 are
given in Fig. 31. The probability of coherence is given by the ratio of the coherent pair of
pulses to total pair of pulses. Therefore, for the duration of the entire profile, P[C ] = 0.38
is found with the results given below Fig. 31.
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Figure 31: Energy levels in the range bin of interest for each pair of pulses during profile#6

(Number of coherent pair pulses= 58674, Number of noncoherent pair of pulses= 38938, Number of
separate pair of pulses=56388, Number of total pair of pulses=154000).
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Probability density function for profile #5 is given in Fig. 32. Similarly different
energy levels can be set as a threshold for coherence and the respective probability for
coherence can be evaluated for this profile as well.
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Figure 32: Probability density function for 6000 feet lineabreast formation.
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4

VI. Results
Result 1

Impact of flight path and formation geometry on the coherence of jamming
signals is verified through modeling and simulation. Different probability of coherence
values are found for different flight paths and formation geometries. This outcome
verified the existence of an interactive relationship between flight path and formation
geometry and the EW effectiveness.
Result 2

Evaluation of the nature of this interactive relationship in six different flight
profiles revealed that specific flight paths and formation geometries can be designed
during the mission planning processes to enhance the jamming effectiveness. The nature
of the results arrived in Chapter V dictates that the formation geometry should be
designed for the specific time period of the flight profile. Because it is observed that the
overall probability of coherence for the entire flight profile may be misleading. For
instance, a line abreast formation yielded higher probability of coherence in the initial leg
of the flight profile while a fighting wing formation yielded higher probability of
coherence in the second leg of the flight profile.
Result 3

The location of the victim radar is verified to be the vital input in deciding the
instantaneous formation geometry of the tactical formation during the engagement. With
this information available, mission planning processes may produce proper formation
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geometry and flight path to increase the survivability. This result implies that the
hypothesis postulated in the beginning of the research is valid provided that the all vital
inputs are present during the mission planning. Applications of the results are further
discussed from the perspective of survivability in the next section.
Application of the Results

The results imply that the quasi-coherent effects caused by two self-protection
jammers can create stronger false targets in the radar receiver. Hence, the false target can
degrade the threat radar’s capability to track and launch threat missiles at the aircraft
increasing aircraft survivability. The next stage of this work is to develop a model for
probability of survival based on probability of coherence. The analysis of the engagement
level survivability can be visualized as a tree diagram shown in Fig. 32. Similar
methodology for “mission level survivability” can be found in [22].
In order for the threat weapon system to kill the aircraft at the end of the
engagement, the flow of the events \ and ] must follow the solid arrows on the right.
Probability of Survival, PS , is the complement of the Probability of Kill, PK , and two
events have mutually exclusive and exhaustive outcomes [22]. It should be noted that
Fig. 32 is drawn for “non-coherent EA”. When the same analysis is carried out for the
engagement where “coherent EA” is implemented (assuming that all other factors remain
constant) the resulting new probability of kill may be expressed in terms of the original
PK as
PK' = α PK
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(30)

where PK = P[] | \]P[\] . Therefore, the probability of survival for coherent EA is
PS' = 1 − α PK .

The scaling factor α reflects the impact of coherent EA on the survivability. It is
then possible to decide the increase in survivability of a strike formation through coherent
self-protection jammers.

\

Threat radar detects the formation, starts to
track and launch a missile despite NONCoherent Jamming

1 − P[\]

P[\]

]

Successful missile guidance and
intercept despite
NON-coherent EA

1 − P[] | \ ]

P[] | \]

PS = 1 − PK

PK = P[] | \]P[\]

Figure 32: Probability of survival tree diagram.
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VII. Conclusions and Future Work
Conclusion

This preliminary experiment revealed that it is possible to measure the impact of
coherent jamming on combat aircraft survivability through the method of difference. The
evaluation of basic tactical formation geometries and flight paths from the perspective of
jamming effectiveness proved that proper mission planning may increase the total
survivability. These positive results can be viewed as a motivation to conduct more
extensive research with a high fidelity tracking radar model and a flight simulation which
includes an atmospheric model.
Future Work

The application of interconnection of the coherent SPJ jammers via a data link to
exchange processed data may be explored from the perspective of sensor fusion
techniques. The advantages of sensor fusion applications such as the datalink between the
airborne radars of tactical aircraft are briefly discussed in [1]. Cooperative tactical
operations that use a data link can be organized into three categories: situation awareness
(threat tracking, system status), offensive operations (attack planning, missile handoff),
defensive operations (EW, missile warning) [55]. This study can be further evaluated in
all three categories mentioned above. The future research may also shift its tactical
perspective from manned aircraft to Unmanned Combat Aircraft Vehicle (UCAV) and
respective sensor fusion application opportunities as well.
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